File:Budgeting for counterproliferation (IA budgetingforcoun1094542796).pdf

In the Bottom-Up Review conducted in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, DOD identified the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the new primary threat to the national security of the U.S. In response to this new threat, the Clinton Administration signaled a shift in emphasis in proliferation policy to include counterproliferation as a major policy goal. This thesis examines proliferation policy from a resource perspective. After a brief history of past U.S. proliferation policy and the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI), the Administration's FY 95 budget request for policy support for this new initiative is analyzed. The purpose is to provide insight concerning the extent to which a consensus on resources for this new initiative exists between the executive and legislative branches. The thesis concludes that both the Administration and Congress agree that counterproliferation is an appropriate means to deal with the new threat. The Senate was supportive of the new initiative throughout the budget process, whereas the House was not. However, Congress as a whole increased support for the initiative by appropriating $60 million, almost twice the Administration's request. There was confusion between the Administration and Congress regarding the proper account for funding the initiative. Consequently, Congress zeroed the Administration's original request for counterproliferation studies in the O&M account, but added back $60 million to the RDT&E account for the DCI, indicating that the initiative was more technology oriented and required RDT&E funds.