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English: The relationship between zero-determinant (ZD), cooperating and defecting strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). Cooperating strategies always cooperate with other cooperating strategies, and defecting strategies always defect against other defecting strategies. Both contain subsets of strategies that are robust under strong selection, meaning no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade such strategies when they are resident in a population. Only cooperating strategies contain a subset that are always robust, meaning that no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade and replace such strategies, under both strong and weak selection. The intersection between ZD and good cooperating strategies is the set of generous ZD strategies. Extortion strategies are the intersection between ZD and non-robust defecting strategies. Tit-for-tat lies at the intersection of cooperating, defecting and ZD strategies.
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