File:AVOIDING TWO WARS- REDUCING DRUG PRODUCTION AFTER NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN CIVIL CONFLICTS (IA avoidingtwowarsr1094564094).pdf

This thesis’s overall aim was to answer the question: Was it possible for the Colombian government to achieve lasting peace through its 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) without leading to an increase in drug production? Critics of the peace deal and U.S. policymakers point to several concessions made during the peace negotiations (amnesty, reparations, drug trafficking, natural resources, and land reform) as likely causes of a spike in coca production. The Colombian government insists these concessions were necessary to achieve a signed peace agreement. A quantitative analysis of a global dataset demonstrates that none of the controversial provisions within the Colombian peace deal have a significant relationship with conflict recurrence, while political party reform proves to be the most significant of all independent variables to achieve lasting peace. Thus, the Colombian government can reduce coca production without increasing the risk to return to armed conflict by working jointly with the newly created FARC political party to revamp haphazardly implemented land reform agreements. The Colombian government needs to avoid latching on to baseless quick-fix solutions (e.g., aerial spray programs) and limit its adherence to provisions in the peace deal that have no impact on a lasting peace. Under these conditions, the Colombian government can avoid a heightened drug war following the end of a fifty-year-old civil war.