English subtitles for clip: File:Press Briefing on Security Review.webm

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Mr. Gibbs:
Good afternoon, or good early evening. I want

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to first apologize for the delay in the events
that have occurred over the past couple hours.

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As you all know, declassifying a highly complex
document takes some time, and we wanted to

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get that right. You all should have either
with you or in your inbox two separate documents

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that were emailed out. The first is a summary
of the White House review, which is that declassified

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document that I spoke of a second ago, and
secondly, a memo, three-page memo, signed

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just a little while ago by the President on
corrective actions that have been ordered.

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We will hear momentarily from two individuals
 -- Secretary Napolitano from the Department

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of Homeland Security, and John Brennan, Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security and

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Counterterrorism. After they speak, we will
spend about half an hour or so taking your

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questions. I know many of you all have deadlines,
so if you need to sneak out of here, that

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is certainly fine to do. And we will hear
first from John.

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Mr. Brennan:
Thank you, Robert. Good evening, everyone.

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As the President said today, following the
attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day,

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he directed me to conduct an immediate review
of the watchlisting system that our nation

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uses to prevent known or suspected terrorists
from entering our country. He also directed

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key departments and agencies to provide their
input to this review, and I want to commend

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Secretary Napolitano, Director of National
Intelligence Blair, and other leaders of the

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intelligence community for their cooperation,
candor, and support. Now, let me say that

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every department and organization provided
the information that was needed. That speaks

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to the seriousness with which this administration
takes what happened on Christmas. It also

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speaks to our urgency and determination to
make sure that this does not happen again.

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The review had three primary goals: to get
the facts to find out what happened, to identify

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the failures and shortcomings of what went
wrong, and to make recommendations on corrective

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action so we can fix the problems. And I want
to address each of these areas. First, the

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facts. As the President has described in his
public remarks, in the weeks and months leading

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up to the Christmas attack, various components
of our intelligence community had fragments

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of information about the strategic threat
posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,

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or AQAP, and the specific plot of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab. It was known that AQAP not

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only sought to strike U.S. targets in Yemen,
as they had when they attacked our embassy

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in San'a in 2008, but that it also sought
to strike the U.S. homeland. Indeed, there

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was a threat stream of intelligence on this
threat. It was known, thanks to the warnings

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of his father in November, that Abdulmutallab
had developed extremist views, and his father

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feared he had joined unidentified extremists.
And, as the summary points out, there was

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information about an individual now believed
to be Mr. Abdulmutallab and his association

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with al Qaeda. These are among the fragments
of intelligence that were available in the

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intelligence community on Christmas Eve, before
Abdulmutallab ever boarded the aircraft in

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Amsterdam. Of course, the central question
is, given the fragments of intelligence we

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did know, why weren't they integrated and
pieced together in a way that would have uncovered

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and disrupted the plot? That leads to the
second line of inquiry: What went wrong? As

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the President described, this was not the
failure of a single individual or a single

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organization. Yes, there were some human errors,
but those errors were not the primary or fundamental

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cause of what happened on December 25th. Rather,
this was a systemic failure across agencies

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and across organizations. I want to be very
clear about this, because there's been some

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confusion out there. In recent days, it's
been widely reported that we saw the same

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failures before 9/11 or the same failure to
share information, and after eight years,

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why hasn't this been fixed. Before 9/11, there
was often reluctance or refusal to share information

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between departments and agencies. As a result,
different agencies and analysts across agencies

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were at times denied access to the critical
information that could have stopped the tragic

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9/11 attacks. And over the past eight years,
those issues have largely been resolved. That

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is not what happened here. This was not a
failure to share information. In fact, our

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review found the intelligence agencies and
analysts had the information they needed.

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No agency or individual was denied access
to that information. So as the President has

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said, this was not a failure to collect or
share intelligence. It was a failure to connect

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and integrate and understand the intelligence
we had. We didn't follow up and prioritize

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the stream of intelligence indicating that
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sought to

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strike our homeland because no one intelligence
entity or team or task force was assigned

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responsibility for doing that follow-up investigation.
The intelligence fell through the cracks.

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This happened in more than one organization.
This contributed to the larger failure to

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connect the fragments of intelligence that
could have revealed the plot, Abdulmutallab's

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extremist views, AQAP's involvement with a
Nigerian, its desire to strike the U.S. homeland.

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This in turn fed into shortcomings in the
watchlisting system, both human and technological,

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which resulted in Abdulmutallab not being
placed on the watchlist, thereby allowing

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him to board a plane in Amsterdam for Detroit.
And while the watchlisting system is not broken,

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how the intelligence community feeds information
into that system clearly needs to be strengthened.

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Which brings us to the recommendations: How
do we fix the problem? Today the President

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is issuing a directive to all the relevant
agencies on the corrective actions he has

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decided on. There are more than a dozen corrective
steps altogether, and each is assigned to

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an agency that is now responsible for their
implementation. As the President said, they

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fall into four broad areas. First, he is directing
that our intelligence community immediately

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begin assigning responsibility for investigating
all leads on high-priority threats so that

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these leads are pursued and acted upon aggressively
so that plots are destructed. Second, he's

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directing that intelligence reports, especially
those involving potential threats to the United

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States, be distributed more rapidly and more
widely. Third, he's directing that we strengthen

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the analytic process. Director of National
Intelligence Blair will take the lead in improving

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day-to-day efforts. The President's Intelligence
Advisory Board will examine the longer-term

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challenge of identifying and analyzing intelligence
among the increasingly vast universe of intelligence

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that we collect. That challenge dealing with
the volumes of information is growing every

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day. Finally, the President is ordering an
immediate effort to strengthen the criteria

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used to add individuals to our terrorist watchlists,
especially the "no fly" list, so that we do

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a better job keeping dangerous people off
airplanes. The President said he is going

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to hold all of us -- his staff, his national
security team, their agencies -- accountable

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for implementing these reforms. The national
security staff is going to monitor their progress.

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The President has directed me to report back
on the progress within 30 days and on a regular

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basis after that, and I will do so. Taken
together, these reforms are going to improve

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the intelligence community's ability to do
its job even better -- to collect, share,

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integrate, analyze, and act on intelligence
swiftly and effectively to protect our country.

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And finally, I want to say that in every instance
over the past year the intelligence community,

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the homeland security community, the law enforcement
community has done an absolutely outstanding

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and stellar job in protecting this homeland
and disrupting plots that have been directed

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against us. It was in this one instance that
we did not rise to that same level of competence

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and success. And therefore, the President
has told us that we must do better. I told

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the President today I let him down. I am the
President's assistant for homeland security

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and counterterrorism. And I told him that
I will do better and we will do better as

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a team. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano:

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Thank you. I want to update all of you on
the actions the Department of Homeland Security

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took immediately following the failed Christmas
Day attack and the longer-term recommendations

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that DHS made to the President in our preliminary
report. These recommendations lay out how

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we will move forward in a number of areas
that are critical in our efforts to protect

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air travel from terrorism. As many have already
experienced, we have immediately strengthened

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screening requirements for individuals flying
to the United States. Every individual flying

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to the United States from anywhere in the
world who has an itinerary or passport from

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nations that are state sponsors of terrorism
or countries of interest is required to go

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through enhanced screening. In addition, the
majority of all other passengers on United

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States-bound international flights will go
through random threat-based enhanced screening.

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At airports throughout the United States,
we have deployed additional airport law enforcement

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officials, behavior-detection officers, air
marshals, and explosive-detection canine teams,

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among other security measures, both seen and
unseen. I want to express our thanks to the

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traveling public for their patience with these
security measures. And I want to thank as

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well the Department of Homeland Security personnel
who have been engaged on a day-in, day-out

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basis to implement them since Christmas. Today
I would like to describe to you five of the

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recommendations that are included in our report
to the President. First, there needs to be

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a reevaluation and modification of the criteria
and process used to create the terrorist watchlists.

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This will involve the Department of Homeland
Security and other members of the intelligence

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community. Specifically the effort will include
evaluating the process by which names are

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put on the "no fly" and selectee lists. Let
me pause here a moment to say that the Department

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of Homeland Security works day in and day
out with the NCTC and with other members of

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the intelligence community. These are dedicated
men and women. All of them are dedicated to

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the safety of the United States. Here, as
John has indicated, we simply had a systemic

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failure. Now, DHS, as you know, uses the lists
as the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent

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suspected terrorists from boarding airplanes
bound for the United States. Second, we will

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establish a partnership on aviation screening
technology between DHS and the Department

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of Energy and its national laboratories. This
will allow government to use the expertise

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that the national labs have to develop new
and more effective technologies, so that we

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can react not only to known threats, but also
to proactively anticipate new ways by which

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terrorists could seek to board our aircraft.
Third, we should accelerate deployment of

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advanced imaging technologies, so that we
have greater capabilities to detect explosives

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like the ones used in the Christmas Day attack.
We currently have 40 machines deployed throughout

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the United States. In 2010, we are already
scheduled to deploy 300 more. We may deploy

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more than that. But the TSA does not conduct
screening overseas, and the Christmas Day

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incident underscored that the screening procedures
at foreign airports are critical to our safety

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here in the United States. Therefore, we have
to do all that we can do to encourage foreign

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authorities to utilize the same enhanced technologies
for aviation security. After all, there were

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passengers from 17 countries aboard Flight
253. This is an international issue, not just

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one about the United States. Fourth, we have
to strengthen the presence and capacity of

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aviation law enforcement on top of the measures
we have already taken. This includes increasing

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the number of federal air marshals. And we
will begin by deploying law enforcement officers

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from across the Department of Homeland Security
to help fulfill this important role. And,

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fifth, working with the Secretary of State,
we need to strengthen international security

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measures and standards for aviation security.
Security measures abroad affect our security

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here at home. The Deputy Secretary of DHS
and other top officials from my department

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have for the last several days been on a multi-country,
multi-continent mission meeting with top transportation

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and airport officials, discussing ways to
increase cooperation and security. Later this

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month, I'll be traveling to Spain to meet
with my European counterparts for what will

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be the first in a series of meetings with
counterparts that I believe will lead to a

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broad consensus on new international aviation
security standards and procedures. These five

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recommendations that I have just described
are important areas where DHS and other federal

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agencies are moving quickly to address concerns
revealed by the attempted attack. Added to

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the intelligence review also underway that
John Brennan just described, these are changes

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that will help us prevent another attack from
ever advancing as far as the one did on Christmas

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Day. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbs:

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Yes, ma'am.
The Press:

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The President talked about using enhanced
screening technologies. Does he intend to

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deploy the body imaging systems as the primary
method of screening for all airports across

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the country? Is that the goal?
Secretary Napolitano:

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I think we look at security as a system of
layers. It is advanced screening technology;

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it is the magnetometers with which people
are so familiar; it's explosive detection

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technology; it is canines, an increased use
of canines; it's behavior-detection officers;

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it's increased law enforcement presence, both
uniformed and undercover. It's that series

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of layers that we will be adding to the security
we already have at our domestic airports in

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the wake of this instance.
The Press:

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Following up on that, you said that 300 additional
of these scanners will be deployed in 2010.

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Was that planned before this event? And you
said more may be developed -- more may be

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deployed on top of that. How many more, and
how much will that cost?

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Secretary Napolitano:
The answer is it was planned before this 

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-- it was already in funding that the Congress
had appropriated for the TSA. With respect

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to how many more need to be done, we will
be working on that as part of our ongoing

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review as to how many are needed. But again,
I would caution you not to focus solely on

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that technology. As I just explained to Elaine,
this is a series of layers that we deploy

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and will be enhancing their deployment of
at domestic airports.

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The Press:
Just one follow-up, Robert, if I can. Both

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of you and the President also mentioned the
word "accountability," and all three of you

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have made a point that it was several agencies
and not just one person. But if there are

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several people in several agencies, who's
being held accountable now?

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Mr. Gibbs:
Well, Jeff, I think as you heard the President

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now on a number of occasions, including today,
take responsibility for the system that we

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have right now. That's what led the President
to ask these two individuals to conduct reviews,

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to seek where we fell down and how we can
plug those holes. Our focus right now and

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the President's focus is on the timely completion
of that review and to implement his directive

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for corrective action as quickly as possible.
We don't have any announcements other than

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that today. As you have heard the President
say, the buck stops with him. But the team

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understands that what John started is a dynamic
process -- and we talked about that in here

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I think yesterday -- that will continue over
the course of the next 30 days, and then long

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after that, to ensure that what has been outlined
by all these different agencies in acknowledging

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their responsibility for the attack -- they've
acknowledged that they'll take the corrective

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action that's necessary. I would also mention
the billion dollars the President mentioned

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in his remarks about technology was contained
in the Recovery Act. Dan.

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The Press:
To Mr. Brennan, the President kept referring

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to -- certainly at one point he referred to
him as a "known terrorist." It's my understanding

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he was a known extremist. Was he a known terrorist?
And to both of you, what was the most shocking,

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stunning thing that you believe came out of
the reviews?

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Mr. Brennan:
As far as being a known terrorist, we knew

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that Mr. Abdulmutallab had departed from Nigeria
and was in Yemen associating with extremists.

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This came directly from his father. So you're
right. We knew from that stream of information

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that he was extremist and had those radical
tendencies. The rest of the intelligence indicated

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that this plot was underway. We did not map
up the two, that intelligence about this individual

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who was a terrorist, who was in fact a Nigerian,
with Mr. Abdulmutallab. So what we knew about

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him, the person -- an extremist -- what we
knew about this other plot developing, and

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the individual involved in that was in fact
a terrorist.

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The Press:
So he's a known alleged terrorist now after

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the fact, a know extremist at the time?
Mr. Brennan:

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He's a terrorist now.
The Press:

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What was the most shocking, stunning thing
that you found out of the review? And, Secretary,

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to you, as well.
Mr. Brennan:

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Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is an extension
of al Qaeda core coming out of Pakistan. And,

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in my view, it is one of the most lethal and
one of the most concerning of it. The fact

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that they had moved forward to try to execute
this attack against the homeland I think demonstrated

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to us -- and this is what the review sort
of uncovered -- that we had a strategic sense

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of sort of where they were going, but we didn't
know they had progressed to the point of actually

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launching individuals here. And we have taken
that lesson, and so now we're full on top

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of it.
Secretary Napolitano:

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I think, following up on that, not just the
determination of al Qaeda and al Qaeda Arabian

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Peninsula, but the tactic of using an individual
to foment an attack, as opposed to a large

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conspiracy or a multi-person conspiracy such
as we saw in 9/11, that is something that

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affects intelligence. It really emphasizes
now the renewed importance on how different

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intelligence is integrated and analyzed, and
threat streams are followed through. And,

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again, it will impact how we continue to review
the need to improve airport security around

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the world.
Mr. Gibbs:

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Helen.
The Press:

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Was there an outside contractor used or security
in Amsterdam? And also, what is really lacking

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always for us is you don't give the motivation
of why they want to do us harm.

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Mr. Gibbs:
Why don't you take the first part, and then,

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John, you can address the second.
Secretary Napolitano:

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The screening at Schiphol Airport was done
by Dutch authorities. And they did the screening

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that was described to you earlier this afternoon.
The hand luggage was screened, the passport

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was checked, he went through a magnetometer.
But it was done by Dutch authorities.

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The Press:
And what is the motivation? We never hear

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what you find out on why.
Mr. Brennan:

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Al Qaeda is an organization that is dedicated
to murder and wanton slaughter of innocents.

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What they have done over the past decade and
a half, two decades, is to attract individuals

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like Mr. Abdulmutallab and use them for these
types of attacks. He was motivated by a sense

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of religious sort of drive. Unfortunately,
al Qaeda has perverted Islam, and has corrupted

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the concept of Islam, so that he's able to
attract these individuals. But al Qaeda has

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the agenda of destruction and death.
The Press:

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And you're saying it's because of religion?
Mr. Brennan:

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I'm saying it's because of an al Qaeda organization
that uses the banner of religion in a very

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perverse and corrupt way.
The Press:

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Why?
Mr. Brennan:

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I think this is a -- this is a long issue,
but al Qaeda is just determined to carry out

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attacks here against the homeland.
The Press:

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But you haven't explained why.
The Press:

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Can we clear up a couple of things, either
one of you? First of all, what was learned

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while the flight was underway? There have
been a couple of stories suggesting that additional

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information came to light after the flight
took off, and that Mr. Abdulmutallab was going

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to be questioned when he arrived. That's one.
Secretary Napolitano:

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Why don't I answer that one? In Schiphol,
his name did not appear on any terrorist screening

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watchlist. And so nothing pinged to keep him
off of the plane. While in the air, Customs

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in Detroit has access to the entire TIDE database,
and as we now all know that's the large mega-database;

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it has 500,000-plus names in it. And they
knew he had a ping there, and so they were

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ready, when he landed in Detroit, to question
him about that -- that ping against the TIDE

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database.
The Press:

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Before the attack?
Secretary Napolitano:

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But the terrorist watchlist -- but the terrorist
watchlist, the terrorist screening watchlist

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did not have his name on it.
The Press:

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The other question is, why was Director Leiter
allowed to take leave after the incident on

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December 22nd?
Mr. Brennan:

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I'll take that issue. When the incident occurred
on Christmas Day, a number of people came

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in to their offices and focused on it immediately.
I was in constant contact with Mike Leiter

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throughout the afternoon, throughout the evening.
Mike Leiter raised with me that he was in

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fact scheduled to go on leave to meet his
son, and he asked me whether or not he should

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cancel that trip. I asked Mike about whether
or not he had a full complement of folks and

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his deputy was going to be in place. Mike
said he did. And I said, Mike, no, you deserve

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this vacation, you need to be with your son,
so I was the one who told him he should go

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out there. The events that took place on December
25th -- our review has looked at what transpired

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before then. Since then I think we have all
sort of recognized that the government, the

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intelligence community, the homeland security
community, has worked seamlessly well. And

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we were in constant contact with one another
throughout the period and the week after the

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attack.
The Press:

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First question, when did we first -- for Mr.
Brennan -- when did we first know that AQAP

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had intentions to strike the U.S. homeland?
How early?

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Mr. Brennan:
In the intelligence that we have acquired,

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over the past several years it's been rather
aspirational. It has said things, it has promoted

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a certain view as far as bringing the fight
to us, but all of their activities, at least

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that we were focused on, were happening in
Yemen. They carried attacks against Prince

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Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, against
Saudi targets, inside of Yemen, against Yemeni

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as well as against U.S. targets. So it was
aspirational. We saw that there was this mounting

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sort of drumbeat of interest in trying to
get individuals to carry out attacks. That

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was the fragmentary information. And so in
hindsight now -- and 20/20 hindsight always

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gives you much better opportunity to see it
 -- we saw the plot was developing, but at

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the time we did not know in fact that they
were talking about sending Mr. Abdulmutallab

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to the United States.
The Press:

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Can I just ask you just one follow-up? I just
 -- your first recommendation is to assign

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responsibility on all leads that are high
priority. And it just seems like that would

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be the basic premise of any intelligence system.
It seems so fundamental. I'm sure people wonder,

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really, that's the reform we need?
Mr. Brennan:

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What we've done so far since 9/11 is to really
help to distribute information throughout

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the community -- increase capability throughout.
There are a lot of different organizations

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involved. I think what we're trying to do
is to make sure that as these threads develop

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-- and there are so many of them -- that
it's clearly understood who has the lead on

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it. Because most times, CIA, DHS, FBI, NTCT
and others are working it. What we want to

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do is to make sure that for each one of these
threads there's a lead and they're going to

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make sure that it moves forward.
The Press:

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Mr. Brennan, you mentioned the problems of
intelligence-sharing before 9/11. But after

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9/11, when the 9/11 Commission Report came
out, it was all about connecting the dots.

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And at that time there was a pledge by the
intelligence community to do better on connecting

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the dots. And I'm wondering why, from that
 -- not from the pre-9/11 but from the post-9/11

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Commission standpoint -- why dots weren't
connected. And when you say you're going to

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improve analysis, how is it going to happen
this time when it didn't happen that time?

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Mr. Brennan:
Second point first. Analysis has, in fact,

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improved steadily. As I said, we have an amazing
track record here within the United States,

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the intelligence community across the board,
as far as identifying these plots early, disrupting

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them, thwarting them, and preventing those
types of attacks -- in every instance. So

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what we want to do is to make sure that we
even raise that game even higher. As far as

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information-sharing and those dots, in the
past, before 9/11, you had dots in separate

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databases that were separated from one another
and were not connected from a network standpoint.

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Also you had a husbanding of those dots by
individual agencies and departments. We don't

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have that anymore. There's better interoperability.
There's better accesses. More places have

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access to more of those dots that come in.
And so that's the challenge, is making sure

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that we can leverage the access to those dots
so we can bring it up and identify all of

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these threats.
The Press:

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Madam Secretary, you mentioned -- the President
mentioned major investments forthcoming. There's

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already a billion dollars in the stimulus.
Can we expect more investments beyond that

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billion dollars? And how will that be paid
for? There are talks about raising airline

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security fees to cover some of these costs.
Secretary Napolitano:

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Oh, I think it's premature to make those statements
right now. I think that's part of the ongoing

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review that we'll undertake as the -- in the
coming days and the coming weeks.

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The Press:
But the major investment will be more than

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the billion in the stimulus? There's more
money that will likely be requested beyond?

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Secretary Napolitano:
Like I said, I think it's premature to put

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a number on it, but I will say that as part
of our review we will be making ongoing recommendations

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to the President about what needs to do with
domestic airports. But don't lose sight of

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the fact, he was screened at an international
airport and it's the international air environment

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that we also need to work on. And that's why
we have undertaken this very rapid reach-out

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around the globe to say, look, this is an
international issue; this affects the traveling

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public of people in countries around the world,
their safety. These terrorists don't discriminate

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when they get ready to take down a plane.
And so that's a very important part of the

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ongoing process as well.
The Press:

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Robert, might we be able to ask non-terror-related
questions at the end of this time?

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Mr. Gibbs:
If there's time I'm sure we can get some.

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The Press:
Mr. Brennan, I want to pick up on something

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that General Jones said in his interview with
USA Today. He referred to the Fort Hood massacre

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as strike one, and I'm curious if you can
explain the to American public why things

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that were learned after Fort Hood -- Yemen,
a cleric who has quite a visible role in advocating

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for terrorism -- didn't create within the
intelligence community and the larger apparatus

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a higher sensitivity to the kinds of things
also visible in the Abdulmutallab case. And

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how much does that disturb you? And secondarily,
were you personally briefed, sir, by the prince

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on counterterrorism in Saudi about the possibility
of explosives being hidden in garments or

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clothing, and did that get communicated down
the system as well?

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Mr. Brennan:
On the issue of Mr. Awlaki, yes, we were very

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concerned after the Fort Hood shooting about
what else he might be doing here. And that's

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why there was a very determined and concerted
effort after that to take a look at what else

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he might be trying to accomplish here in the
homeland. Now, remember, Mr. Abdulmutallab

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was a much different story in terms of a Nigerian
who traveled to Yemen and then came over here.

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But what it clearly indicates is that there
is a seriousness of purpose on the part of

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al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to carry
out attacks here in the United States -- 

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whether they're reaching people through the
Internet, or whether or not, in fact, they

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are sending people abroad.
The Press:

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Are you satisfied that the intelligence community
sort of rose up and responded to what it learned

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about Fort Hood in a way that worked or didn't
work --

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Mr. Brennan:
Absolutely. I think we've already taken those

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corrective steps. That's one of the things
 -- I might want to just pause here and say

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-- President Obama has directed several reviews
of incidents, Fort Hood as well as this. This

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one has been completed -- a preliminary report
 -- within two weeks' time. Lightning speed,

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in my three decades within the U.S. government,
as far as being able to bring an issue all

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the way through to have reports so we can
take corrective action as soon as possible.

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We've already done that with the Fort Hood
report. We're all -- instituting those changes.

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We're doing that here. This is going to be
the start of a process. But within two weeks'

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time we've been able to identify, diagnose,
and now take corrective steps so that we can

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ensure that this is not going to --
The Press:

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And the Saudi prince?
Mr. Brennan:

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Yes, I was. I went out to Saudi Arabia a week
after that attack, was able to work with the

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prince, see the place where -- the room where
the attack took place; talked about the explosives

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that were used in that and the concerns about
it -- and we had serious concerns about it.

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That was an assassination attempt. And we're
continuing to work with the Saudis and others

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about these types of techniques that are being
used by al Qaeda. And I think as Secretary

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Napolitano said, what we're trying to do is
to stay a step ahead. Obviously they are looking

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at all these different types of techniques
so they can defeat our security perimeter,

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so what we need to do is continue to advance
and evolve. And that's what we're doing.

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The Press:
Mr. Brennan, do you have any concern that

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the nation's national security apparatus is
being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information

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it takes in? Are you confident that you can
keep up with just the volume of stuff that

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you --
Mr. Brennan:

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I think the national security record, particularly
on the counterterrorism front, is superb 

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-- what this country has been able to do,
what the counterterrorism community has been

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able to do with the increasing amount of information
and the collection systems that have come

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in. In fact, I think you see that what happened
last month in Yemen, with our very good counterterrorism

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partner in Yemen, was able to actually address
the growing threat of al Qaeda there, because

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of the tremendous ability for us to be able
to collect information and use it swiftly.

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So I think the national security establishment
is well served by the changes that have taken

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place over the last half-dozen years, as well
as what we're trying to do here in this administration

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to make sure that we're able to use the information
that exists within the different datasets

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to address our national security priorities.
The Press:

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Mr. Brennan, you said that one of the most
alarming things that you found was the strength

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of this al Qaeda cell in Yemen. What else
is it capable of did your review find or do

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you believe?
Mr. Brennan:

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Well, as I said, they have taken a number
of different paths to try to carry out an

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attack. That attack against Prince Mohammed
bin Nayef, a suicide bomber concealed within

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his clothes an explosive device that in fact
was very similar to the one that was used

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by Mr. Abdulmutallab. They're also, though,
carrying out attacks against hard structures

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like the embassy, our embassy in San'a in
2008. So there's a diversity there, but there's

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also several hundred al Qaeda members within
Yemen. And what we need to do is continue

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to work very closely with our Yemeni partners
and other international partners to make sure

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that we're able to drive al Qaeda down within
Yemen -- because they do present a serious

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threat there, but also abroad.
The Press:

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Why should this have been such a surprise,
though, sir? Why should this have been such

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a surprise?
Mr. Brennan:

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What I'm saying is that where they were able
to bring a person into that execution phase

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and actually put them on an airport [sic]
coming here to the United States -- I would

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say that was one of the failures, as far as
we saw that this increased activity was taking

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place, but we were not focused enough on making
sure that we were able to identify whoever

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was going to be used to carry out that type
of attack.

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The Press:
Have you learned anything that would suggest

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that this terror suspect specifically chose
Detroit perhaps to send a message to the large

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Arab American population there? And on that
point, when the President today talked about

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his concern about lone recruits being attracted
to al Qaeda and their messaging, he talked

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about wanting to have some special efforts
to break those kinds of -- that kind of appeal.

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Is there anything that you'll be doing specifically
in an area like southeastern Michigan that

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has a very large Arab American and Muslim
population?

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Secretary Napolitano:
The Department of Homeland Security has had

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outreach efforts into different populations,
Muslim American populations, Somali communities

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across the United States over the last years,
trying to build bridges so that there's good

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communication between us, even in the face
of those who would distort a religion for

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terrorist purposes. We need to look at strengthening
those activities. We also need to look at

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the whole issue of what is called counter-radicalization:
How do we identify someone before they become

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radicalized to the point where they're ready
to blow themselves up with others on a plane?

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And how do we communicate better American
values and so forth in this country but also

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around the globe? How do we work with our
allies like the U.K. on this? That's been

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a major topic of conversation between us and
the U.K. over the prior months. So you are

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right to point out that there's a whole kind
of related issue here, which is, how do we

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get into the process before somebody becomes
so radicalized that they're ready to commit

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this kind of an act?
The Press:

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And did you find any reason to suspect that
that particular flight was chosen because

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it was headed to Detroit, given the large
Yemeni and Arab American population there?

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Secretary Napolitano:
You know, I think that's within the purview

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of the criminal case, so it wouldn't be appropriate
for comment right now.

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Mr. Gibbs:
April.

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The Press:
This goes to Madam Secretary and Mr. Brennan.

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Focusing on the international issue, Yemen
as well as Africa, since this attack, has

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anyone from the Yemen embassy, or the Yemen
ambassador, come to the White House since

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the attack happened recently to talk to anyone
about this? Do you know?

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Secretary Napolitano:
I can't talk to communication at the White

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House, but I suspect John can.
Mr. Brennan:

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We've been in regular contact with the Yemeni
government. I've spoken to President Salih,

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in fact, after this event took place, and
the Yemeni Foreign Minister in fact is going

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to be coming here. So there have been a number
of interactions with our people in San'a as

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well as with Yemeni officials.
The Press:

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Now the issue of extradition, the way I understand
it there's no extradition from Yemen. Is that

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an issue, particularly with the breeding of
terrorists there and extremists? Is that on

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the table with the Yemen government, extraditing
them --

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Mr. Brennan:
Back here to the United States? If in fact

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there is a reason to do that, we will do that,
if they have someone.

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The Press:
Okay. And also, on the Africa issue, some

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in the national security community are saying
that the focus needs to be placed on the continent

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of Africa. You talked -- the President has
talked about Somalia. And there are breeding

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grounds in Africa where extremists from the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border are going to Somalia.

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And there's a fear that the tentacles will
spread from there into Northern Africa, into

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Europe. Have you or anyone here talked to
any of the African leaders? And is AFRICOM

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appropriate to handle this kind of situation
right now after the Christmas attack?

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Secretary Napolitano:
Let me just say that as I mentioned, we've

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already deployed high officials from our department
around the globe, and indeed, they will be

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going to Africa as well. They need to be part
of the solution. This is a global travel issue,

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not just, as I said before, the United States.
So, indeed, there is active engagement there.

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Mr. Brennan:
There are many different groups in Africa

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that are of serious concern, from a terrorist
perspective -- al Qaeda in East Africa, al-Shabaab,

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al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. We have had
a ongoing and robust dialogue with African

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countries and leaders, as well as with other
countries in the area. But we see that it

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is an area in fact that al Qaeda preys upon,
that they particularly are looking in Africa

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for recruits, and this is something that we're
very concerned about and following.

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The Press:
So why not do more of a focus instead of just

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having AFRICOM particularly just handle this
right now?

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Mr. Brennan:
AFRICOM is just one of many elements of the

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U.S. government, as far as the Department
of State and others, who are engaging with

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African countries and leaders in a way to
address this issue from the standpoint of

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both cooperation, security training, and assistance.
Mr. Gibbs:

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Margaret.
The Press:

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Thank you. John, is there -- to follow up
on Michael's question, is there any information

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that the government has been able to analyze
now that you had prior to Christmas but hadn't

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gotten to analyze yet, that is now fitting
retrospectively into sort of explaining what

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had happened?
Mr. Brennan:

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There's a lot of information that's being
reanalyzed and reevaluated in light of this,

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because any type of incident like this, it
gives us new insight into methods, modus operandi

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and other types of things. So there's scouring
going on right now of all the different datasets

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within the intelligence community to identify.
And we are pursuing a number of leads as a

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result of that review.
The Press:

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Could you tell us about any of those -- presumably
the report today was scrubbed. Is what was

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released today to us a greatly redacted version
of what's been presented to the President,

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and does that explain the delay this afternoon?
Mr. Gibbs:

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As I said earlier, part of the delay is in
declassifying a very complex document, and

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we apologize for the delay. Lynn.
The Press:

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Is the system already in place -- meaning,
if the father would have gone into -- went

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to the embassy, could be a similar situation
today, would a ping immediately happen; would

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the crosstab come up with the fact that the
person had a visa, for example? And that's

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-- isn't that one of the things that you're
talking about? So I'm wondering if the fix

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is already installed. And to Secretary Napolitano,
since there aren't body-imaging machines all

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over the world, I take it that pat-downs might
be used. What do you say to people who are

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just squeamish about personal privacy being
invaded and body searches?

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Secretary Napolitano:
Well, obviously, as we move to strengthen

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security we always have this balance to be
struck with issues about personal privacy.

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Here in the United States we train officers
on how to properly conduct a pat-down. They

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do it in other countries around the world
as well. Part of the initiative that we are

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undertaking is to make sure that that kind
of training and capacity is built in continents

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around the globe. But you are right -- it
is likely, in addition to the things that

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I listed, that there will increases of pat-downs
as well.

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Mr. Brennan:
On the first question, I'm confident that

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we have taken a variety of corrective measures
that would have allowed us, had we taken them

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before, to identify Mr. Abdulmutallab as somebody
of concern. He was identified as an extremist

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by his father -- not a terrorist, not somebody
who was planning to carry out a violent act.

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But particularly the National Counterterrorism
Center has been working day and night for

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-- since this December 25th attempted attack,
has been scouring all of the databases --

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identities databases as well as all-source
databases -- to make those correlations. And

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I'm confident that they have done that very
thoroughly.

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Mr. Gibbs:
Thank you, guys.