File:Abraham Lincoln and the battles of the Civil War (1887) (14762473492).jpg

Identifier: abrahamlincolnba02newy (find matches)
Title: Abraham Lincoln and the battles of the Civil War
Year: 1887 (1880s)
Authors:
Subjects: Lincoln, Abraham, 1809-1865 Generals Generals
Publisher: (New York, N.Y.) : (The Century Co.)
Contributing Library: Lincoln Financial Foundation Collection
Digitizing Sponsor: The Institute of Museum and Library Services through an Indiana State Library LSTA Grant

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my either atChambersburg, or at some point on a linedrawn from that place through Heidlersburgto York. Cnder these circumstances, Meadeinformed Reynolds that he had not yet de- cided whether it was his best policy to moveto attack before he knew more definitelyLees point of concentration. He seems, how-ever, soon to have determined not to advanceuntil the movements or position of the enemygave strong assurance of success ; and thatif the enemy took the offensive, he wouldwithdraw his own army from its actual posi-tions and form line of battle behind PipeCreek, between Middleburg and Manchester.The considerations probably moving him tothis are not difficult to divine. Examinationof the map (see the November Century) THE SECONE> DA V AT GETT\SBI rRG. 279 tain passes. As Meade be-ieved Lees arm) to be atleast equal to his ovthe elements of the prob-cm were in favor of thePipe Creek line. BmMeade orders for Jul)1st, drawing his < or) 3towards the threatenedflank, carried Reynolds to
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will show that such a linewould cover Baltimore andWashington in all directionsfrom which Lee could ad-vance and that Westminster,his depot, would be imme-diately behind him, withshort railroad communica-tion to Baltimore. It would,moreover, save much hardmarching, and restore tothe ranks the thousands ofstragglers who did not reachGettysburg. From Westminster—whichis in Parrs Ridge, the easternboundary of the valley of theMonocacy— good roads led in all directions,and gave the place the same strategic valuefor Meade that Gettysburg had for Lee. Thenew line could not be turned by Lee withoutimminent danger to his own army, nor couldhe afford to advance upon Baltimore or Wash-ington, leaving the Army of the Potomac in-tact behind and so near him; —that would beto invite the fate of Burgoyne. Meade thencould safely select a good offensive-defensiveline behind Pipe Creek and establish himselfthere, with perfect liberty of action in all di-rections. Without magazines or assured com-

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