File:General headquarters, 1914-1916, and its critical decisions (1919) (14597669420).jpg

Identifier: generalheadquart00falk (find matches)
Title: General headquarters, 1914-1916, and its critical decisions
Year: 1919 (1910s)
Authors: Falkenhayn, Erich von, 1861-1922
Subjects: World War, 1914-1918 World War, 1914-1918
Publisher: London Hutchinson
Contributing Library: Robarts - University of Toronto
Digitizing Sponsor: University of Toronto

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the General Staffconsidered it necessary that active operations in theWest should be undertaken concurrently with the openingof the submarine campaign. Yet we could not tell atthe moment when that would be possible. The strain on the homeland had, of course, been verygreat. However, our refusal to raise new formationson a great scale after the summer of 1915 had preventedthat strain from reaching the breaking-point. Ourrecruiting situation was secure for a long time to come,and developing in a regular manner. We could oncemore consider the question of raising new formationson a larger scale. In spite of that we had succeeded inincreasing the output of war material to correspond torequirements without dangerously shaking the economicfabric of the country. It was on the lines then laid downthat the maximum production of the year 1917 wasreached. They seemed to be capable of completelysatisfying all demands that could then have been antici- 288 Brussiloffs Offensive in the Summer of 1916
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The Campaign of 1916 pated. As a matter of fact they not only did so, butthroughout the war our scheme remained the model formunitions production. Our relations to the Turkish, as to the BulgarianGeneral Staffs, were never troubled by the slightestfriction. Both adhered unswervingly to the allianceand were always ready to adopt without questioningany measure recommended by G.H.Q. In the same way our personal relations with theAustrian General Staff could not be described as bad ;at any rate no signs of anything else could be observedin our intercourse. A certain tension which had arisenin the winter in consequence of an attempt by the AustrianHeadquarters to get rid of the influence of G.H.Q. hadlong vanished, after personal explanations. In our business relations with the Allied GeneralStaff there was, of course, a line on the far side of which acertain constraint inevitably took the place of friendlyunderstanding. That line was reached when it was aquestion of imposing reasonable li

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